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ABSTRACT
Seafood production governance, primarily and traditionally a
governmental activity, is increasingly designed and performed
by private actors, such as business organizations and/or Non-
Governmental Organization. This is often seen as complementary
to public regulation in handling collective problems, but there
are few studies within the aquaculture sector which investigate
the extent and potential of such arrangements. The aim of this
paper is to study self-regulation among groups of fish farmers as
a means to solve collective challenges in the commons and to
derive lessons for future cooperative arrangements. Using data
from the Norwegian salmon industry, we investigate the extent
of private self-regulated collaborations, the motivation for collab-
oration, and the self-reported obstacles. We further elucidate the
strengths and weaknesses of such arrangements, both regarding
day-to-day operations and in times of crisis. The findings show
that private self-regulation plays an important role in increasing
available resources in addressing common challenges and coor-
dinating the production to limit negative externalities. However,
such arrangements cannot work in isolation and need to be
aligned with the role and functioning of public authorities. In
fact, the looming shadow of the state is an important prerequis-






The aquaculture industry currently contributes 47% of the total global sea-
food production and has already overtaken fishing as a source of seafood for
human consumption (FAO, 2018). Moreover, globally foreseen to strengthen
its importance as production is expected to continue to increase (Anderson
et al., 2019; Kobayashi et al., 2015). The production of carp and tilapia repre-
sents the highest volumes globally, but salmon is the second largest species by
value after shrimp, and as the largest salmon producer Norway is in the top
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ten aquaculture producing countries in the world, by both volume and value
(Garlock et al., 2020). Salmon farming in Norway benefits from favorable
physical conditions such as a lengthy and sheltered shoreline, and optimal sea
temperatures, but equally important are the biological and technological
innovations that have made the aquaculture industry in Norway one of the
most advanced globally (Asche, 2008; Bergesen & Tveterås, 2019). This has
been made possible due to a good governance regime stemming from both
the government and the industry itself. In Norway and elsewhere, creating a
good and predictable system for regulating aquaculture production is crucial
for limiting environmental externalities and to allow future sustainable
growth of the industry (Young et al., 2019), even though this is not always
straightforward (Osmundsen et al., 2017, 2020). Hersoug et al. (2019) provide
an overview of the development of the formal Norwegian regulatory system.
The current governance system for the aquaculture sector, both in Norway
and elsewhere, consists of national public regulations (Abate et al., 2018;
Osmundsen et al., 2017; Robertsen et al., 2016; Solås et al., 2015), supple-
mented by private certification schemes (Amundsen, 2020; Bush et al., 2013;
Osmundsen et al., 2020; Washington & Ababouch, 2011), and self-regulation
arrangements initiated by individual companies, groups of companies and
industry associations. Self-regulation is often organized either within an indi-
vidual company as guidelines or company standards, or as cooperative
arrangements between several companies. It is the latter which is the subject
of this paper.
Area cooperation, zone management, beyond-farm cooperation, spatial
management and area-based management are just some of the terms that
depict different organizational models for mitigating shared production
risks in aquaculture (Bottema, 2019; Bottema et al., 2019; Bush et al., 2019;
Joffre et al., 2019; Murray & Gubbins, 2016), which are alternatives to
larger integrated firms (Asche et al., 2013; Oglend & Tveterås, 2009). The
combined effort of multiple actors in a given area is often seen as a useful
way of reducing the cumulative and combined impacts of aquaculture prac-
tices. Such arrangements range from self-regulating cooperative models ini-
tiated by and between fish farmers to governmentally induced zoning of
aquaculture activities in a given area. The common motivation of these
arrangements is that there are benefits to collective action, especially
because open net-pen fish farming shares the same waters, and the exter-
nalities associated with this production process cannot be handled by one
actor alone, but need to be addressed in unison.
Cooperation has always been central to the aquaculture industry in
Norway. The Norwegian aquaculture industry (Hovland et al., 2014)
has since the beginning been characterized by trial and error, and extensive
collaboration. The pioneers tried, failed and learned from each other.
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The Grøntvedt brothers at Hitra, who were the first to introduce salmon
net-pens in the sea, were for years engaged in knowledge dissemination to
other potential fish farmers. Even when the industry became more institu-
tionalized, the free flow of information and experience was considered
important and was safeguarded, both in the Norwegian Fish Farmers’
Association (NFF) and in the Fish Farmer’s Sales Organization (FOS).
Aquaculture research, financed directly by the government (The Research
Council of Norway) or by an export fee (Norwegian Seafood Research
Fund), has consistently pursued an open knowledge policy where new dis-
coveries have been made available to all interested fish farmers. This is in
contrast to many other countries, where research results have been much
more privatized and unavailable (Hersoug et al., 2014). This has contrib-
uted to the rapid development of everything from technological solutions
to the use of feed and vaccines, where the Norwegian aquaculture industry
is considered a world leader (Aarset & Borgen, 2015) and probably signifi-
cantly enhanced the effect of private research among suppliers (Asche,
2008; Tveterås & Heshmati, 2002).
Although the industrialization of the industry has led to a stronger pres-
ence of large multinational companies who are less likely to share the
details of their knowledge and (bio-)technological solutions (Aarset &
Borgen, 2015; Borgen & Aarset, 2016), and an increased focus on propri-
etary knowledge, collaboration still appears to play a central role in
Norwegian aquaculture industry. On the other hand, there has been little
research into the extent and degree of such cooperation beyond demon-
strating the presence of agglomeration effects (Asche et al., 2016; Tveterås,
2002) Currently, there exists a number of different types of collaborative
arrangements. Some fish farmers operate and produce their fish in cooper-
ation, others share a common location, some operate joint set-up facilities,
or organize joint procurement, such as the Norwegian collaborative organ-
ization “Salmon Group.” According to traditional economic theory, these
are solutions chosen to gain access to more resources and better informa-
tion, and are alternatives to horizontal integration (Parmigiani & Rivera-
Santos, 2011).
Cooperation in the aquaculture industry is also driven by other consider-
ations, as fish farming is an activity with significant environmental exter-
nalities (Osmundsen et al., 2017). The fish farmers operate in the
commons, and the use of open net-pens influence the surrounding marine
environment where ocean currents carry feed residues, fecal and metabolic
products, diseases and parasites. These externalities do not only affect other
fish farms, but may also impact on the environment, and other resources
and activities in the area. Closed systems are being developed but are not
used to any large extent so far (Bjørndal & Tusvik, 2019). Cooperation is
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one approach to handle and limit environmental impact like escapes of
farmed fish, and spread of diseases and parasites.
There is virtually no research as to the effectiveness and practical impli-
cations of these arrangements, a paucity this article will address.
Furthermore, outside of the aquaculture domain and in general, the ques-
tion of regulatory effectiveness and impact is particularly underresearched
when it comes to private and self-regulation (Thomann, 2017). Do private
arrangements regulate common-pool resources as efficiently as the state
would have done? The current state of research suggests that the delegation
of regulatory tasks often does not live up to its promise—in fact causing
worse outcomes than public regulation (Overman, 2016; Overman & van
Thiel, 2016).
In this paper, we investigate, through empirical data from Norwegian
fish farmers and public authorities, the extent of private self-regulated col-
laboration between fish farmers, the motivation for collaboration, and the
self-reported obstacles to collaboration. These insights are used to discuss
the actual problem-solving capacity of these arrangements, which appears
to be common flaws and weaknesses, and the potential of such
arrangements.
Theory
In nature-based production, producers often rely on common-pool resour-
ces that cannot easily be privatized, such as grazing land, waterways or
marine fish stocks. When such resources are to be utilized by many actors
who individually maximize their own profits, the outcome may be signifi-
cantly worse for all parties than if it had been possible to enter into bind-
ing cooperation. Both publicly induced cooperation, where a regulator
mandate cooperation and sanction noncompliance, and private collabor-
ation arrangements are seen as solutions to what is often referred to as
“the tragedy of the commons” (Kragesteen et al., 2019). Collaboration is
often defined as relationships that develop between two or more formally
independent organizations as a result of a mutual agreement on the future
exchange of resources, joint activities or joint decision-making. There is a
large body of research on collaboration, both on benefits and drawbacks,
and how collaboration can succeed (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999,
2007; Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). It is often emphasized that
through cooperation one has the opportunity to solve problems that indi-
viduals cannot solve alone. In other words, the basis for the cooperation is
mutual dependence between the actors. In fish farming with open nets, this
interdependence is very evident.
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Benefits to collective action
Research shows that there are many potential benefits of working together.
Collaboration is seen as a means to access resources that individual farmers
have limited control over on his own. Such resources include the possibility
of increased control over what affects the individual facilities, access to
technology and physical resources, providing increased capacity and com-
petence and access to markets. Collaboration can lead to increased profit-
ability for each partner through the spread of risk and cost, resource
sharing, expanded flexibility, increased access to technology and knowledge,
or new markets (Phillips et al., 2000). Cooperation between different actors
can thus contribute to economies of scale that a single actor alone cannot
achieve, so-called external economies of scale or agglomeration. Other ben-
efits of collaboration are to gain access to legitimacy and reputation, as well
as a stronger political position (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). The fact
that several actors stand together and show that they are working together
to solve common problems can give increased power and influence, and
may ensure stakeholders that the industry is taking responsibility for
addressing important challenges.
Collaborative models in aquaculture have been found to increase the
financial and technical capacity of small-scale producers (Ha et al., 2013;
Kassam et al., 2011; Mohan & De Silva, 2010), facilitate knowledge transfer
(Srinath et al., 2000), and support horizontal coordination to mitigate dis-
ease risk in wider areas (Pettersen et al., 2015; World Bank, 2014). Joffre
et al. (2019) finds that cluster formation is positive in order to mitigate
production and market risks, integrate small-holders in the value chain,
and enhance adoption of new technologies and practices (Kilelu et al.,
2017). Tveterås (2002) show that productivity is higher, and Asche et al.
(2016) that profitability is higher in industry clusters in Norwegian salmon
farming. Oglend and Tveterås (2009) argue that collaboration between
regions can spread risk, and Bottema et al. (2019) find that area-based
management must be based on homogenous interpretation of risks. That
means that joint interest and shared experience is the best starting point
for establishing and developing area-based management. Socio-spatial areas
should also be seen as building blocks for the management of wider areas.
Further research is needed to provide better understanding of the extent to
which external actors can stimulate collaboration between farmers to
collectively manage environmental risks.
Regulation
Regulation is the controlling of an activity or process, often by means of
rules, and may take many different shapes and forms. While regulation was
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earlier seen as primarily a governmental activity, modern notions of regula-
tion also includes hybrid forms of regulation based on social control (for
an overview see Thomann, 2017). When we speak about regulation—it is
thus not something that only the public authorities do—in fact “regulation
is occurring within and between other social actors, for example large organi-
zations, collective associations, technical committees, professions etc., all with-
out the government’s involvement or indeed formal approval” (Black, 2001,
p. 103). In this paper, self-regulation among a group of fish farmers is seen
as a regulatory instrument and process that aims to regulate behavior and
performance in a given area. Such modes of regulation are often private
and voluntary, yet they occur in “the shadow of the state.” The shadow of
the state refers to the threat of state intervention if voluntary regulation
fails to take place (Heritier & Eckert, 2008). Heritier and Eckert (2008) also
argue that not only is the shadow of the state a precondition for self-regu-
lation to develop, but also that a looming shadow of control needs to be
continuously in place to sustain self-regulatory efforts and obtain satisfac-
tory results.
To be willing to participate in collaboration, the actors must acknow-
ledge that they are mutually dependent, that cooperation is necessary and
can have a positive effect on solving common challenges. If the actors do
not cooperate, the shadow of the state looms as a threat that may impose
collaboration through top-down regulation. However, according to Ostrom
(1990), imposed cooperation is considered unsuccessful and is seen as
rarely sufficient for effective cooperation to take place. She shows that vol-
untary cooperation on common natural resources is a good way to build
trust and create effective solutions, and she warns against too much regula-
tion by public authorities. However, there are some factors that must be
present for collaboration to be successful. Such factors include that the
members of the collaborative group are clearly defined and recognizable,
that everyone’s actions are observable, that there are opportunities for
graded sanctions against those who may violate the rules of cooperation,
and that the benefits of collaboration are clear, reasonably distributed, and
not subject to excessive uncertainty. If these conditions are met, then there
are good opportunities for voluntary cooperation to be kept stable over
time, so that the resource is managed in a good way by those who are
financially dependent on it, and who often know it best.
Material and methods
This study draws its finding from multiple sources of data. These can
broadly be categorized as two main studies. The first is concerned with
cooperation between fish farmers regarding day-to-day operations, while
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the second is concerned with cooperation in a time of crisis. These are
described below.
Investigating cooperation in day-to-day operations
Firstly, an initial survey charting the type of cooperation existent in the
Norwegian aquaculture industry was carried out. The survey was conducted
by e-mail and phone to representatives from the aquaculture industry. It
contained five questions concerning the topic of the cooperation, the geo-
graphical area, whether the cooperation was mandated by law or voluntary,
and who the respondents cooperated with (fish farmers, authorities, and/or
suppliers). In total 22 respondents participated in this initial study, 16 from
the aquaculture industry and 6 from public authorities. The respondents
came from different geographical areas in Norway and represented both
small, medium and large fish farming companies and public authorities
relevant for aquaculture regulation.
Based on these initial results, cooperation regarding operation activities
and emergency preparedness was identified as the most common type of
cooperation. Focusing on these two categories of cooperation, a more in-
depth study was undertaken. Results have been summarized in Karlsen
et al. (2019). The study was administered by a surveying company and was
conducted by phone interviews and web-survey. The study was initially car-
ried out as a web survey, but due to a low response rate, phone interviews
were initiated to increase the number of responses. The questions asked
were the same for both settings. The number of respondents was 37
Norwegian fish farmers. This represents approximately 35–40% of salmon
and trout farmers in Norway, the total in 2019 being approximately 100
(NOU, 2019). Both small, medium and large companies were included in
the study. The study was based on an interview guide, with the following
main categories:
a. The topic of cooperation with industry, public authorities and/or suppli-
ers within a defined geographical area
b. Whether the cooperation is required by law or voluntary
c. Challenges and opportunities of cooperation
In addition, an in-depth interview was conducted with representatives
from the Norwegian Food Safety Authority, as they control and supervise
fish farmers’ compliance with the aquaculture management regulations and
are responsible for approving the operation plans. Two respondents from
the Food Safety Authority were interviewed in the fall of 2018. This was
recorded on tape and transcribed.
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Investigating cooperation in a time of crisis
A toxic algae bloom in the northern part of Norway (in the counties of
Nordland and Troms) occurred during the spring of 2019, and represented
an opportunity to gain knowledge on how collaboration between fish farm-
ers unfolds in a time of crisis. To chart the course of events and the level
of emergency preparedness during the algae bloom, three of the authors
conducted 17 interviews with fish farmers, industry representatives,
researchers and public authorities. These results have earlier been summar-
ized in Norwegian (Hersoug et al., 2019; Karlsen et al., 2019). Interviews
were conducted by phone or face-to-face. An interview guide was prepared
for each group of respondents. The interviews focused on the perception of
the respondents as to the course of events of the algae bloom, what actions
their organizations had taken, who they communicated and collaborated
with, and the potential improvements they wanted to recommend for simi-
lar events in the future. Interviews were recorded and transcribed.
Findings
We present a finding which elucidates the extent of private self-regulated
collaboration in Norwegian fish farming, the motivation for collaboration,
and the self-reported obstacles to collaboration, both during day-to-day
operations and a time of crisis.
The extent of collaboration
An initial charting of the area based cooperation existent in Norwegian
aquaculture industry revealed that (neighboring) fish farmers cooperate on
a range of different issues (Karlsen et al., 2019). The respondents reported
that their collaboration was mainly in areas such as “operating activity,”
“emergency preparedness,” “area governance/planning” and “strategical
cooperation,” where the two first categories appeared to be most common,
as shown in Figure 1. A few of these collaborations are mandated by law,
below illustrated with the § character in the figure.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the study showed great diversity in the topics the fish
farmers cooperated on. In the continuation of the study, we looked specifically
at cooperation related to operation activity and emergency preparedness, the
first two categories in Figure 1. This is where we find most of the existent
cooperation. According to the in-depth survey, all of the respondents cooperate
with other fish farmers in their areas concerning operation activity and emer-
gency preparedness (N¼ 37). Operation activity concerned sharing resources,
equipment and facilities, information and knowledge, and coordinating the
timing of certain actions, such as fallowing. And while operation activity is the
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most common theme for the respondent in the initial survey, emergency pre-
paredness is the second most used category for cooperation identified in the
initial study. According to findings from the initial study and the study of the
algae bloom, such preparedness is related to emergency plan, surveillance,
warning systems, crisis teams, list of resources available in times of emergency,
coordination between fish farms and authorities, media relations, fire drills,
recapture of escapees, fish health, outbreak of contagious diseases, acute pollu-
tion, and access to fresh water resources.
On some of these topics, the Norwegian Food Safety Authority is
increasingly mandating neighboring fish farmers to cooperate through
coordinated fallowing of sites. This is accomplished by evaluating the sum
of the operation plans from different fish farmers in an area and approving
them if they satisfy fish health and welfare considerations.
Incentives to cooperate
The incentive for most of the respondents to cooperate with others about oper-
ation activities and emergency preparedness is to be able to reduce the risk for
diseases and parasites, secondly to reduce negative environmental impacts and
thirdly to improve the profitability of operation activities, as shown in Figure 2.
Most of the respondents find that cooperating with others on topics such
as the time of sea transfer of fish, and fallowing of geographical areas are
important for optimizing their own production. As seen in Figure 3,
cooperation regarding coordinated delousing is regarded as less important
than the other two topics. One of the reasons might be that fish farmers
expose the fish to delousing treatments to a lesser extent than earlier, but
rather have continuous control with salmon lice through the use of cleaner
fish or other means. The coordination of such treatments is therefore not
as important as before.
Figure 1. Topics for collaboration in the Norwegian aquaculture industry.
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In comments to the survey, a different incentive brought forward by the
informants is that the authorities may instruct them to cooperate if they
fail to establish cooperation themselves. One of the informants also state
that if the cooperation only involves fish farmers, and not public author-
ities, cooperation can be established faster. Another informant suggests that
having shared problems is an important incentive for establishing
cooperation.
Figure 3. The informants’ responses as to what they consider important to coordinate in order
to optimize sea production, measured on statements “it is important to coordinate fallowing,”
“it is important to coordinate sea transfer,” and “it is important to coordinate delousing.”
Numbers shown as frequencies, N¼ 37.
Figure 2. The informants’ responses to why they choose to cooperate with others measured
on questions “we cooperate to reduce the risk for diseases and parasites,” “we cooperate to
reduce negative environmental impacts,” and “we cooperate to improve profitability.” Numbers
shown as frequencies, N¼ 37.
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The informants were also asked whether it should be the industry or the
public authorities who initiates cooperation (Figure 4).
When asked who should be responsible for initiating and establishing
cooperation between fish farmers the respondent’s responses diverge. Only
13 (of 37) of the respondents state they agree this should be a responsibility
for the public authorities. Also, on the question whether such cooperation
should be voluntary or mandatory, 21 respondents respond that this should
be voluntary (Figure 5).
On the other hand, we find disagreement among the respondents as to
the extent to which universal or more "tailor-made" solutions to challenges
are considered suitable for issues that may vary widely from one area to
another. This also reflects the disagreements as to whether it should be the
authorities or the industry who is responsible for cooperation.
Figure 4. Informants’ responses to the statement “public authorities should be responsible for
establishing cooperation.” Numbers shown as frequencies, N¼ 37.
Figure 5. Informants’ responses to the statement “cooperation should be voluntary.” Numbers
shown as frequencies, N¼ 37.
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Experiences with cooperation
The majority (23 of 37) of the informants report that they cooperate well
with other fish farmers in their area, as shown in Figure 5. However, some
of the informants state this is just partly true, and that cooperation only
includes either just the small companies (7 informants) or the large compa-
nies (3 informants). Two of the informants state that they do not have
good cooperation in their area, and two reports that they are all alone in
their geographical area, and therefore do not see the need to cooperate
with others.
While the majority state they have good cooperation, conflicts can arise.
The informants report that cooperation in areas where many fish farmers
are located, and where there is a high density of sites are most prone to
conflict, as shown in Figure 6. Such conflicts may arise when new fish
farmers attempt to establish themselves in areas where others have been for
a long time, and where there is already a well-established cooper-
ation structure.
According to the respondents from the Food Safety Authority, the main
challenge toward establishing good cooperation between fish farmers is access
to sites. According to a couple of the fish farmers (commenting on the survey)
there is an unwritten rule between the farmers about not competing with each
other on access to sites. However, there is reason to believe that this does not
apply everywhere and between all farmers, see also Figure 7.
The fish farmers are reluctant to give up sites they have gained access to,
and this limits the possibilities for restructuring. To be able to design new
and improved fallowing zones1 fish farmers may be required to swop sites
or agree to close sites. A consequence already seen in certain areas, is that
due to lack of cooperation, some of the fallowing zones becomes too small.
The distance between the zone and adjacent sites outside of the zone
becomes too small, and the fallowing becomes less effective. According to
Figure 6. Informants’ responses to the question “How well do you cooperate with other fish
farms in your area?.” Numbers shown as frequencies, N¼ 37.
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respondents from the Food Safety Authority, the incentives for the fish
farmers to cooperate should be stronger. In the current regulatory system,
cooperation and willingness to share resources and coordinate with others
is not rewarded. According to these respondents, perhaps one would see
stronger cooperation if the incentives were stronger (Figure 8).
The findings show that all the respondents acknowledge that cooperation
is necessary and important on a number of different topics. Even though
the fish farmers willingly enter into a binding cooperation, they appear to
be uncertain whether the cooperation is strong enough to handle difficult
challenges. One respondent state that “it is easier to agree on a plan, but
harder when something happens.” The respondents express a concern,
regarding the strength of the cooperation in a situation where participants
are challenged to prioritize the collective good over the benefit of their
own company. Cooperating farmers may disagree on how to solve difficult
situations, in particular regarding who will have to bear the burden if a
situation can be alleviated by actions taken at one farm, and not the others.
According to the respondents, it appears that the rules governing the
cooperation are perhaps not clear or specific enough for all participants.
Whether or not the cooperation is able to function when things becomes
challenging is especially visible in a time of crisis, and as we will see below,
the findings of this study also shed light on such situations.
Cooperation in a time of crisis
The study of the toxic algae bloom reveals the problem-solving capacity of
collaboration between fish farmers in the affected area during a time of
Figure 7. Informants’ responses as to why they think conflicts arise between fish farmers,
measured on statements “conflicts arise when there are several farms in one area,” “conflicts
arise when there is short distance between farms,” and “conflicts arise for other reasons.”
Numbers shown as frequencies, N¼ 37.
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crisis. The findings also expose the status of the area’s emergency prepared-
ness. These findings have earlier been presented in Karlsen et al. (2019).
In the spring of 2019, 14 Norwegian salmon farms in the northern part
of Nordland County and the southern part of Troms County were hit by a
toxic algae bloom2 (Chrysochromulina leadbeaterii). In less than three
weeks, the farmers lost 8 million salmon (Salmon salar), a total of 14,000
tons. While this had relatively little impact on the national total production
of salmon, the bloom hit the farmers hard, some losing up to 85% of the
total fish they had in the net pens. The toxic algae bloom hit small,
medium sized as well as large-scale producers. Due to extraordinary profits
the preceding five years, none were threatened by bankruptcy, but the loss
means reduced deliveries to processing plants over the next two years, leav-
ing many workers unemployed, with economic repercussions in many
coastal communities. The collaboration to handle the crisis was extensive, it
was run by the farmers themselves with support from governmental agen-
cies and research institutions, and it included all the farms hit by the
bloom, irrespective of size, ownership and command of internal resources.
The findings reveal that, regardless of size and capacity, all fish farmers
in the affected area were engaged in solving the crisis. Not only did they
cooperate during the warning period (to notify everybody and to attain
knowledge about the algae bloom), but also in the practical handling of
the crisis. The majority of those interviewed explained that all helped
each other with equipment, personnel, and other resources, also fish farm-
ers outside the affected area joined in to offer help. Respondents from the
public authorities confirm the shared efforts and cooperation undertaken
by the fish farmers. There was continuous dialogue and coordination
between the fish farmers, and as emphasized by one respondent, no one
disagreed. One of the respondents, however, stated that they had not
received direct assistance from other farmers because all the farms in their
Figure 8. Informants’ responses to the statement “increased competition about access to sites
limits cooperation.” Numbers shown as frequencies, N¼ 37.
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areas was hit simultaneously, and there was no one that could assist on
their farm.
However, according to most of those interviewed, all of the fish farmers
offered to share their resources, prioritizing the farm and area where the algae
attack was most imminent. Such priorities were decided through daily and
continuous contact between fish farmers, and authorities in the area. The alga
caused dead fish in large numbers, which is a practical challenge for any fish
farmer. Respondents emphasized that the amounts of dead fish were also a
psychological challenge for the employees, dealing with an animal tragedy.
When the algae hit, the fish had to be removed quickly, in order to pre-
vent escapes and/or to avoiding sinking the entire net pens. Capacity was
used across the various farm sites, and the ordinary collectors of dead fish
for silage had to be assisted by fishing vessels (purse seiners) with a higher
capacity to pump dead fish. The same applied to grinding capacity and
delivery to silage companies.
Improvization and informal contact appear to have been central to solv-
ing the challenges the fish farmers were faced with. While the respondents
report to have followed the emergency preparedness plans at each farm,
they also had to improvise. The farmers had daily meetings, coordinating
their actions, and directing capacity where the situation was worst. Because
so many farms were hit at the same time, there was a scarcity of many of
the resources, mainly well boats, pumps, grinders and storage for the dead
fish. All the fish farmers had emergency preparedness plans that involved
the same suppliers of the area and these did not have the capacity to serve
all at the same time. The algae bloom caused mortality to such an extent
that the existent emergency preparedness plans did not suffice. The emer-
gency resources mostly referred to in such plans are those that are in use
on a daily basis, and their capacity meets the normal operational needs, but
not those arising in a time of crisis. The fish farmers had to improvise to
access additional resources and acquired these mainly from the wild
catch fisheries.
There was also a need to quickly analyze water samples in order to know
where the alga was moving. Based on an initiative from the industry, the
Coast Guard was brought in, as they had test material onboard and could
function as a lab on sea. Informants state that a lesson for the future is to
increase the available capacity to analyze water samples in the area, and to
be aware that water samples should be taken at different depths, not only
on surface water. Also, a system of real time measurements should be
in place.
Early on, it also became clear that there was a need for emergency sites,
so that fish could be evacuated out of the area. Some of the fish farmers
had access to such sites, because they have sites that were not in use. This
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was, however, not the case for some of the smaller farmers, who needed to
rely on the authorities to make such sites available. A lesson for future
emergencies is to have empty areas and sites that can be made available to
farmers, a resource the public authorities should have command of.
While the fish farmers took the main actions in attempting to salvage
the fish and handle the crisis, there was a strong dependency on local
authorities. The authorities have access to resources, informational over-
sight, knowledge, and can grant permits for some of the actions that need
to be done in such a crisis. The findings demonstrate that collaboration
between private actors and public authorities is decisive in solving
the crisis.
Discussion and conclusions
The general motivation as reported by the fish farmers is that cooperation
with other fish farmers is important on a range of different topics, but
especially for daily operations and emergency preparedness. Cooperation is
important to be able to reduce the risk for diseases and negative external-
ities in an area. They also see that cooperation can improve the profitability
of operations, but this is an incentive which is considered less important in
our survey.
Based on this study, the main motivations for area cooperation in
Norwegian aquaculture can be deduced to concern increased access to
resources (equipment, personnel, knowledge, processing) and coordination
of production (transfer to sea, slaughtering, fallowing), both in daily opera-
tions and emergencies.
Most of the informants in this study have experience with cooperative
arrangements, and most report this to be positive. Conflicts may arise
though, especially when there are many fish farmers within the same area,
and the sites are a short distance apart. Also, new-comers to an area with
an established cooperative arrangement may cause conflict and be difficult
to handle. The informants themselves identify a number of measures that
can increase the problem-solving capacity of self-governance models.
These lessons are summarized in Model 1, a simple performance model
(Norad, 1999), here applied to self-governance arrangements.
The model highlights the input factors that should be in place for such
arrangements, including the specific rules that apply to the cooperation,
and awareness of the division of work between private industry and public
authorities. Informants explain that while day-to-day cooperation appears
to work just fine, they are unsure whether arrangements are strong enough,
and rules clear enough when cooperation is challenged. Cooperation can
for instance be challenged if one fish farmer needs to slaughter his fish
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earlier than scheduled, but the processing plant is fully booked with fish
from other farms. These farms will have to yield, but may suffer fines from
authorities, or have difficulties meeting their orders if they do so.
Cooperation should be clearly defined through agreements, where actions
of the parties involved are visible to all, and where there are sanctions for
those who violate cooperation agreements. Furthermore, both the costs and
benefits of the cooperation should be clear, they should be reasonably dis-
tributed and not associated with excessive uncertainty. One example is the
need to improve the cooperation between fish farmers and well boat com-
panies to ensure clear rules for the division of responsibilities and costs in
the transport of sick fish. The same applies to agreements with fishing boat
companies for the transport of dead fish.
Based on this study, we see that there is a need for more knowledge
about the formal agreements that are established between fish farmers, and
between fish farmers and their suppliers. Such knowledge could be used to
provide advice on how such agreements should be designed; what elements
should be included, what rules should be used including for shared deci-
sion-making, and how sanctions should be specified.
The findings also point to the division of work between private industry
and public authorities. This study shows, both in daily operations and in a
time of crisis that there is a need to be more explicit on how private self-
regulating arrangements are dependent on public authorities, both in terms
of access to resources and formal approval of activities. These input factors
are decisive in creating pathways that lead to outcomes and higher-level
impacts of an economic, ecological and social character. The interstices
between different types of governance therefore merit more attention in
future work to strengthen the potential of self-governance arrangements.
Area cooperation in the Norwegian aquaculture industry should as far as
possible be initiated by the industry itself, and be voluntary. To ensure that
both responsibility and accountability for how the industry handles its
cumulative externalities remain with the industry, it is important that the
industry is able to steer how such cooperative arrangements within an area
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Model 1. A simple performance model for self-governance arrangements in area collaboration.
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cooperation, as it is rarely sufficient to achieve effective cooperation. This
is supported by the Norwegian fish farmers, who believe that cooperation
is more efficient if the industry can cooperate without involvement by the
public authorities. This is also in line with the current recommendations
from The Norwegian Food Safety Authority. On the other hand, the find-
ings of this study also point to the central role that public authorities have
in incentivizing the industry, either directly through regulatory mandates,
or as a looming shadow of control.
In our study, we find that public authorities are important as a purveyor
of resources and legislative approval. It is the combination of efforts from
both private and public actors in sustaining and further improving collab-
oration which can be seen as an efficient mean to regulate behavior and
performance in specific areas. Heeding the advice of Ostrom et al. (2007),
there is no such thing as a panacea for how the governance of aquaculture
should be designed. On the other hand, the findings presented above, dem-
onstrate that in the context of Norwegian aquaculture, there are some les-
sons to be learned both for the industry itself, and for public authorities.
Improvement potential for cooperative arrangements
Conflicts between fish farmers in a limited geographical area during daily
operation can be a significant challenge. Consideration should be given to
establishing a mechanism to deal with such conflicts. This assessment
should include who is responsible and whether there is a need to adjust the
regulations.
Increased competition for sites in the same area limits cooperation on
daily operations and emergency preparedness. Although the main rule
should be that cooperation is voluntary, there will be considerations that
cannot be solved by the companies alone. This applies, for example, to a
shared good such as ancillary emergency sites, which were urgently in need
during the algae attack in the spring of 2019. The counties in collaboration
with the municipalities, the Norwegian Food Safety Authority and the
Directorate of Fisheries should jointly develop a minimum of ancillary
emergency sites in each production area.
The toxic algae bloom raised new issues both with regard to how an alert
service should be organized and what resources should be in place when
the disaster takes the form of emergency (well boats, slaughter capacity,
transport of dead fish, harvesting and alternative sites). The weakness of
the emergency preparedness plans during the toxic algae bloom was that all
fish farmers in an area had plans which involved the same local suppliers
and resources. When all fish farms in an area were hit by the algae bloom,
this quickly exceeded the capacity of these suppliers and resources.
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Emergency preparedness plans in the Norwegian aquaculture industry are
developed for each individual site and have to be approved by the Food
Safety Authority when a new site is to be established, or an existent site is
sought amplified. Such plans can be difficult to assess for two main reasons.
Firstly, they are often based on resources, equipment and suppliers in the
local area that are in use on a daily basis, and not on supplementary resources
reserved for emergencies. Secondly, to predict the amount of resources that
needs to be available when multiple farms and sites are hit simultaneously by
an emergency is difficult. The findings of this study show that fish farmers hit
by the toxic algae were able to improvise and draw on resources from other
industries, such as wild-catch fisheries. A lesson for future emergencies could
be to have supplementary stand-by resources stored away and available on
short notice, or that formal agreements about access to additional resources
are established beforehand. Furthermore, collective emergency preparedness
plans have in some areas been established for several fish farms and sites, but
not in all regions. Also, practical emergency exercises that could demonstrate
flaws in existent plans appear to be very rare.
Emergency preparedness thus appears to be an area where public authorities
should have a stronger presence—a looming shadow of control—in terms of
pushing for improvements in the industry’s actual and practical capacity to
handle emergencies in larger areas.
The importance of cooperation
Although cooperation in sum can be profitable for the Norwegian aquacul-
ture industry, also in a more general sense as increased social support and
legitimacy, several factors can prevent such cooperation from being estab-
lished. The following conditions affect the possibilities for area cooperation
and its design, and can be deduced from this study:
 Knowledge: Aquaculture companies’ knowledge of hydrodynamic, bio-
logical and epidemiological factors affecting externalities.
 Information: Information technologies and systems for harvesting, ana-
lysis and sharing of relevant information on factors affecting aquacul-
ture production, contamination pressures and effects in and outside
aquaculture (e.g., wild salmonids).
 Trust: The aquaculture companies’ trust in each other and attitudes
toward cooperation.
 Institutional framework conditions in the region affecting opportunities
for cooperation.
 Public regulations that directly or indirectly provide incentives or man-
date cooperation.
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Focusing on these factors in future efforts to improve the regulation of
the aquaculture industry may prove fruitful toward strengthening the
industry’s capacity to self-regulate.
Notes
1. Fallowing zones means that aquaculture operations such as stocking, fallowing,
treatments and harvesting are synchronized at all sites in the coordinated area.
2. Algae blooms are experienced by salmon and their farmers globally. In 2016, Chile was
hit by a severe algae bloom, and there has been recurrent ones in Eastern Canada.
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